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Introduction:
Where is There? Locating, Dislocating and Relocating
Gender, Sexuality in Physical and Discursive Space
*

Adele M. Morrison
INTRODUCTION

In keeping with the theme of LatCrit XII, Critical Localities: Epistemic Communities, Rooted Cosmopolitans, New Hegemonies and Know1
ledge Processes, the essays in this cluster critically explore gender, sexuality and location or “whereness”—the combination of physical and discursive
space. In introducing this cluster, I addresses the manner in which each
essay examines the impact of gender and sexuality on whereness and vice
versa. My assertion is that gender and sexuality can be located (spotted or
placed), dislocated (removed or displaced), and relocated (transferred or
replaced) and in doing so, individuals, communities, identities, and locales
may be transformed and that each author addresses some aspect of this
transformation.
In his essay, Gender, Place, Discursive Space: Where is Same-Sex
2
Marriage?, Marc R. Poirier states that “specific spaces and places” can be
transformed by and through the performance of gender and sexuality, and
*
Associate Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law; L.L.M., University of
Wisconsin Law School; J.D., Stanford Law School; B.A., San Francisco State.
1
LatCrit XII, Twelfth Annual LatCrit Conference, Florida International University College of
Law, Miami, Florida. October 4-6, 2007.
2
Marc R. Poirier, Gender, Place, Discursive Space: Where is Same-Sex Marriage?, 3 FIU L.
REV. 307 (2008).
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so too can the performance of gender and sexuality be transformed by and
3
through the location in which they are performed. Though the following
essays each tackle a different subject area and cover issues much broader
than gender/sexuality and “whereness,” all employ a critical analysis to
address both transformation of location by gender and sexuality and of
gender/sexuality by location. Each essay includes a focus on at least one
institution—in the broadest sense of the word. Marc R. Poirier examines
4
the institution of marriage; Aziza Naa-Kaa Botchway examines “religion,”
5
culture, and nations; Larry Catá Backer explores the United States gov6
ernment, focusing on the Presidency; and Diane J. Klein examines popular
7
culture, specifically prime-time television. Common to these institutions is
8
that each has its own “imperatives [and] patterns of subordination.” In this
cluster introduction, I briefly explore the ways in which these four essays
critically locate, dislocate and relocate gender and sexuality in both physi9
cal and discursive space within these institutions as I address the question,
“where is ‘there’ for gender and sexuality?” Each essay, in its own way,
finds that for subordinated sexual and gender identities–lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender (hereinafter LGBT) people and women–that question is
answered at least once “not here,” even as the location of “here” varies.
However, each essay also manages to find a positive location for those with
subordinated genders and/or sexualities.
I first consider Professor Poirier’s essay where he works in the context
of LGBT identities to examine the physical and discursive spaces or lack
10
thereof for same-sex marriage. I begin with this essay because Poirier
helps in understanding the “whereness” that I assert all these essays address. Part II turns to Abolished by Law—Maintained in Practice: The
Trokosi as Practiced in Parts of the Republic of Ghana, where Aziza Naa11
Kaa Botchway addresses the specifically gendered practice of the Trokosi.
Botchway explores the way in which the location, in this case within culture and religion, of a gendered practice—female sexual slavery—can allow
its continuation even as it comes into conflict with national and internation3

Id. at 309.
See id.
5
See Aziza Naa-Kaa Botchway, Abolished by Law—Maintained in Practice: The Trokosi as
Practiced in Parts of the Republic of Ghana, 3 FIU L. REV. 369 (2008).
6
See Larry Catá Backer, Gendering the President Male: Executive Authority Beyond Rule of
Law Constitutionalism in the American Context, 3 FIU L. REV. 341 (2008).
7
See Diane J. Klein, Latino Masculinities Under The Microscope: Stereotyping and Counterstereotyping on Five Seasons of CSI: Miami, 3 FIU L. REV. 395 (2008).
8
Id. at 399.
9
See Poirier, supra note 2, at 311 (defining discursive space).
10 Id. at 311-17.
11 Botchway, supra note 5, at 369-70 (defining Trokosi as when “young virgin girls in Ghana who
. . . become (sexual) slaves of a fetish priest as punishment for the alleged sins and/or crimes of a family
member.”).
4
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al law. In Part III, I look at Larry Catá Backer’s work, Gendering the President Male: Executive Authority Beyond Rule of Law Constitutionalism in
12
the American Context. In critiquing Harvey Mansfield’s article, The Law
13
and the President: In a National Emergency, Who You Gonna Call?, Professor Backer works with the construction and performance of masculinity
and femininity in the Presidency under rule of law constitutionalism and the
differences when that performance is located in the domestic or private
14
sphere versus the international or public sphere. In Part IV, I address how
Professor Klein, in her article Latino Masculinities Under The Microscope:
Stereotyping and Counterstereotyping on Five Seasons of CSI: Miami,
tackles the presentation of Latino identity on the network television show
CSI: Miami. She examines a “Latinoness” within the contexts of the criminal activity and law enforcement settings of the show itself and ultimately
within Miami, Florida—the location of the LatCrit XII Conference that
produced this symposium.
This introduction concludes by noting that in each essay there is a current of defiance against attempts to permanently dislocate gender and sexuality from discursive and physical spaces. Each essay shows that efforts to
dislocate these identities, and the subordinated people themselves, are ineffective because sexuality and/or gender manage to remain on location or to
relocate elsewhere, even to places they are still not accepted. In closing I
state that “whereness” and sexuality and gender are vital aspects of LatCrit
analysis, and thus each of these essays is an important part of this symposium.
I. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: GROUNDING GENDER, SEXUALITY, AND
WHERENESS
Marc Poirier’s essay discusses discursive and physical space in asking
and answering the question “where is same-sex marriage?” The question
refers not only to the discussion about same-sex marriage, but specifically
to where same-sex marriages can be performed. The focus of this query is
on whether particular sites and/or locations are or are not available for solemnizing same-sex marriages. Poirier also addresses how locations of
15
sexuality performativity are limited and controlled by law and custom,

12

Backer, supra note 6.
Harvey Mansfield, The Law and the President: In a National Emergency, Who You Gonna
Call?,
11
THE
WKLY
STANDARD
(17)
Jan.
16,
2006,
available
at
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/563mevpm.asp (last visited Mar.
22, 2008).
14 Backer, supra note 6, at 341, 346-62.
15 Poirier, supra note 2, at 311; see also Botchway, supra note 5, at 371 (discussing how law and
custom control gender and sexuality by determining the fates of numerous women and girls).
13
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which speaks to a broader issue of where LGBT identities are “allowed” to
be.
As Poirier notes, discussing issues of gender and sexuality can make
16
people uncomfortable, sparking a desire in some “not to have to go there,”
meaning individuals prefer not to have to address any aspect of life that
brings attention to sexuality in general and discrimination based on gender
and sexuality in particular. Poirier writes that when it comes to issues of
gender and sexuality, “[T]he local and personal level is where change must
ultimately occur, if a change is mandated via larger normative structures
17
within our society, such as statutory or case law, is to take hold.” Essentially, according to Poirier, it is individuals who must be changed in order to
effect larger change. This point brings to mind the question, “what is the
change that must happen to these individuals?” Though I do agree that individual change does effect larger change, I argue that it is also possible to
change the gender and sexuality of a location and/or to relocate gender and
sexuality themselves. This locale change and/or relocation can in turn effect larger social change. For example, those who move into or out of particular neighborhoods can alter their demographics and identity such that
they become identified as “gay” neighborhoods when “enough” LGBT
people move in and they lose that identity when “too many” LGBT people
18
move out. I assert that the idea that gender and sexuality can be relocated,
maybe to small town America, is what undergirds some of the fears of
same-sex marriage. It is the notion that LGBT folk or same-sex relationships will contaminate a particular locale and thus “traditional” marriages
and the children they produce will be poisoned. The idea is that, as Poirier
19
discusses, the discursive space of, in this case, marriage is altered by a
different performance of sex and gender in the physical space.
20
According to Poirier, it is the “socially visible performances” of
LGBT people, couples and families that alter the discursive space by relocating LGBT identities into places where the LGBTness has been disallowed or dislocated. This raises the question of whether these “socially
visible performances” must be localized or not. In other words, are LGBT
performances as individuals, couples, and parents different depending on
21
22
the locale or institution —the “where” —and should they be? If the an16

Poirier, supra note 2, at 309.
Id. (citations omitted).
18 See, e.g., Patricia Leigh Brown, Gay Enclaves Face Prospect of Being Passé, N. Y. TIMES, Oct.
30, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/30/us/30gay.html (last visited Mar. 22,
2008) (discussing the Castro in San Francisco).
19 See Poirier, supra note 2, at 311.
20 Id. at 310.
21 By locale I mean “a place or locality, esp. with reference to events or circumstances connected
with it.” Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/locale (last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
22 The institutions in this case are the Boy Scouts and a college.
17
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swer is yes, then the burden is placed on the subordinated to change their
sexuality or gender, or at least the performance of it, in order to be accepted
within greater society. But changing the performance undermines it and,
even if the performance can be changed or is changed in one particular
place, it appears that gender and sexuality cannot be actually dislocated.
The Boy Scouts v. Dale case is an example of this. Mr. Dale was not out
when he was within “Boy Scout” space, yet he was excluded because his
sexuality performance in a separate and less rigidly regulated space, at his
23
college, was unacceptable to the Boy Scouts. Even if there are “daily mi24
croperformances” that are localized, one may not shed the identity itself —
thus, here gay, there gay, everywhere gay. Subordinated groups are expected to perform differently depending on location, but yet even when the
performance is altered, the subordinated identity/persons is/are still deemed
to be unacceptable in that, as with Mr. Dale, once identity attaches one
simply is, as in this case, gay, and the location of the gayness ceases to be
the primary concern, dislocated by the gayness in and of itself. It is still
expected, however, that one will perform his or her subordinated identity
differently based on where it is being performed, and there are some spaces
where LGBT identity is banned altogether. One of those spaces with an
25
outright ban is marriage.
Marriage simply is a dominant group—
26
heterosexual and cisgender —space.
Poirier goes on to explain why LGBT persons are problematic for traditionally dominant groups. He writes: “I argue that same sex couples are
troubling for traditionalists in part because their daily visible performances
as couples fail to follow the structures and strictures of sexuality, gender
and family that inhere in traditional marriage and that traditionalists view as
central to the reproduction of social structures from one generation to the
27
next.” The point is that it is simply LGBT existence that is the problem.
28
The ‘failing to follow,’ of which Poirier writes, may be some intentional
act, but more often it is simply being out or outed. This outness is both in
the discursive and physical space, the cultural and geographic location.
The discursive space and cultural locus of the institution of marriage is
contentious, but so too is the actual physical space and geographic location
where the marriages occur. Until the push for legal and social recognition
23

Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644-45 (2000).
Poirier, supra note 2, at 310-11, 325, 328.
25 There are several exceptions to the ban on same-sex marriage. These exceptions as of this
writing include the countries of Canada, Spain, The Netherlands, Belgium and South Africa, and the
states of Massachusetts, Connecticut and (though limited and under challenge at this time) California in
the United States.
26 Julia Serano, WHIPPING GIRL: A TRANSSEXUAL WOMAN ON SEXISM AND THE SCAPEGOATING
OF FEMININITY 33 (2007) (“People who are non-transgender may be described as being cisgender.”).
27 Poirier, supra note 2, at 311.
28 Id.
24

294

FIU Law Review

[3:289

of lesbian and gay relationships, there was little if any consideration for the
impact of same-sex marriages or gay weddings as they were private arrangements and events, meaningful only to those involved. There was no
official recognition and thus no battle over meaning or impact within the
law. It was the onset of a national discourse on gay marriage that made
same-sex relationship-celebratory ceremonies possibly dangerous to wider
29
society, and thus, even those performed outside Massachusetts became
problematic to the point that they needed to be quashed and/or the partici30
pants punished.
LGBT identity has come to occupy a significant portion of discursive
space, but also LGBT people have come to claim a larger part of physical
space as well. The issue of physical presence has been revealed as important in court cases addressing the exclusion of LGBT persons or groups
31
from institutions, organizations or events. At issue seems to be the literal
presence of the homosexual body in a particular location. As Poirier points
out, in Dale “the Court repeatedly discusses the issue in terms of Dale’s
‘presence’ in the organization, using the image of communicative ‘presence’
32
of the body no less than four times.” This indicates that there is no way to
33
dislocate sexuality from body. If one knows of another’s sexual orientation, the individual has a communicative presence. This is the premise un34
dergirding the policy of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” The idea is that if the
military does not “know” then “it” (homosexuality) does not actually exist
and the individual may remain in place. However, if “it” is revealed then
29 See Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (granting marriage rights
to same-sex couples).
30 See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 120 F.3d 211 (11th Cir. 1997) (female plaintiff has job offer withdrawn once employer learns of her plans for a same-sex wedding).
31 See Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 640 (gay man excluded from the Boy Scouts); see also Hurley v.
Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (LGBT organization excluded from marching in the Boston St. Patrick’s Day Parade); Shahar v. Bowers, 836 F.Supp. 859 (N.D.
Ga. 1993) (lesbian attorney excluded from working for the Georgia Attorney General’s office).
32 Poirier, supra note 2, at 315 n.47 (quoting the following text from the Court’s opinion: “We
must then determine whether Dale’s presence as an assistant scoutmaster would significantly burden the
boy scouts' desire to not ‘promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.” Boy Scouts,
530 U.S. at 656. “Dale’s presence in the Boy Scouts would, at the very least, force the organization to
send a message . . . .” Id. “[T]he presence of Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would just as surely
interfere with the Boy Scouts' choice not to propound a point of view contrary to its beliefs.” Id. at 654.
According to Poirer, “Justice Stevens’ dissent is also quite clear that the majority’s opinion rests on
communicative presence, not on the possibility that Dale might become an open advocate of gay causes
at those time and places where he is being a Boy Scout.” (internal citations omitted)).
33 Other essays in this cluster indicate how gender and ethnicity also cannot be dislocated from
the body. See Botchway, supra note 5, at 380 (discussing women and girls who are sent into sexual
slavery because they are women and girls); see also Klein, supra note 7, at 411-15 (discussing Eric
Delko, the Latino CSI who is differentiated from white CSI’s through his dark skin especially as compared to pale, redheaded CSI boss, Horatio Caine).
34 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1997) (policy essentially excluding out lesbian, gay and bisexuals from serving in the United States military).
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the military “knows” and the individual service member must be removed.
35
Though couched in “homosexual conduct” language, the “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell” policy is firmly rooted in the need to dislocate the homosexual
body from the military. So too in Dale, as Poirier notes, “because Dale is
an ‘avowed homosexual[,]’ his own body is already marked. It conveys a
36
message by its very ‘presence within the Boy Scouts.’”
Location is part of law itself. Issues such as jurisdiction, venue and
which law controls in both national and international contexts are revealing.
Each of the essays included here has the law itself with which to contend.
Poirier, in addressing location as territory, geography, states or countries,
discusses the concept of “whereness” of people versus whereness in real
estate, ultimately determining that “[a] person’s whereness perhaps ought to
37
have different consequences from real estate’s whereness.” Laws which
control based on the territory in one which is located ultimately result in a
patchwork of laws regulating morality.
This leads to a question of whether all sexuality is local, meaning
whether the morals of one locale, as determined by the dominant group,
should control. Without addressing issues of morality (such as whether this
is a legitimate area for governmental control or whether same-sex marriages
that are valid in one jurisdiction ought to be valid in other jurisdictions barring public policies or laws to the contrary), the question arises whether
jurisdictions with differing marriage rules are attempting to regulate what
other states or jurisdictions can and cannot do with regard to same-sex marriages. States that choose to confer certain benefits or status on same-sex
couples should be allowed to do so without being undermined by states that
choose not to do so. Poirier suggests that maybe the state that conferred the
status should maintain jurisdiction over the couple, regardless of whether or
38
not the pair are domiciled in the state. Domicile would not affect status,
39
but merely the recognition of that status. Thus same-sex couples married
in Massachusetts or Connecticut would still be married even if they moved
to another state (even if their new state of residence would not permit them
access to the same benefits granted to mixed-sex married couples). But one
aspect of the anti-same-sex marriage argument is that the presence of a legitimately-married-same-sex couple has a negative effect on mixed-sex married couples. The problem is that in some states same-sex marriage is
40
viewed not as a “local public good,” but as a local public evil, and that

35 10 U.S.C. § 654(13) (1997) (“The prohibition against homosexual conduct is a longstanding
element of military law that continues to be necessary in the unique circumstances of military service.”).
36 Poirier, supra note 2, at 312 (internal citations omitted).
37 Id. at 322.
38 Id. at 318.
39 Id. at 321.
40 Id. at 324.
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allowing same-sex spouses to even exist within the boundaries of a given
state, it is argued, will have a horrible impact on the citizenry and the state
as a whole. Thus, states should be legally permitted to exclude or banish
them from their midst.
41
Poirier ventures into an area that Aziza Botchway addresses when he
42
writes of what he refers to as the “aterritorial nomos approach.” Here the
issue is one of culture and the accommodation of different cultures, ad43
dressing “cultural and moral pluralism.”
Rather than on geographical
whereness, the focus is on the commonality of a community’s culture. The
idea is that individuals can create accepting communities within specific
44
locations that are aterritorial. These self-constructed communities would
have spiritual or moral jurisdiction over such issues as whether or not to
permit same-sex marriage. When/if there is conflict within those communities or locales an individual or group could choose to leave for friendlier
45
climes. Choosing to leave is a self-dislocation whereas banishment, such
46
as what happens to the Trokosi, is dislocation by other members of the
community. Poirier discusses dislocation by both the self and others. Botchway discusses the banishment of girls and women, a gender dislocation
47
of girls from home to away, never to return. Larry Catá Backer discusses a
kind of dislocation by external forces when he writes about intragender
policing of masculinity where men regulate the masculinity of other men
and dislocate aspects that do not comport or banish men who do not con48
form.
And Diane Klein discusses a dislocation of Latino masculinity,
especially in the context of Cuban identity, by other Latino identities and
49
constructs of masculinity.
There are specific dislocations from place, but also from discursive
space; however, if gender and sexuality were tied not to place but to cultural community, it would appear that dislocations would be limited. One
could choose to leave the community, go “straight” as it were; however, this
would be voluntary dislocation, not banishment. Also, as Poirier points out
that, by participating in one discursive space or another, we can have differ50
ent forms of marriage that coexist within a territorial jurisdiction.
Another option for dislocation and relocation of discursive spaces,
such as marriage, is to dislocate it from the law and relocate it to a more
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Botchway, supra note 5, at 369.
Poirier, supra note 2, at 325-28.
Poirier, supra note 2 at 325.
Poirier, supra note 2, at 326 (using religious communities as an example).
Poirier, supra note 2. at 326-27.
Botchway, supra note 5, at 370-71.
Botchway, supra note 5, at 391.
Backer, supra note 6, at 341.
Klein, supra note 7, at 395.
See Poirier, supra note 2.
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comfortable place. For example, marriage could be relocated to where religion lies. Still, there is the question of physical space. Where weddings are
performed is an issue for locations, for geographies, for territories. And the
result of the marrying that people do is still a part of the discursive space.
51
The issue in Shahar was that she located herself as married outside of the
safe discursive space of her community, the locale with moral jurisdiction.
In that public discursive space she and her marriage were rejected. But in
Shahar there was an issue of physical space as well in that there was to be a
wedding. It is actual public space, the physical location for the marriage
ceremony—the wedding itself—that Poirier addresses when writing about
52
the Ocean Grove, New Jersey case. A wedding needs a physical place,
and therefore gender and sexuality are being performed in public through
the rite of marrying. Marrying is a public act; the wedding is the stage on
which that act is performed. The where of the wedding indicates the validity, or lack thereof, of the marriage. As Poirier concludes, “in seeking to
attain the normalizing status of marriage, they nevertheless do it differently
and so redefine it. Whether this reaffirms or significantly undermines the
underlying, traditional, gendered structure of the institution remains to be
53
seen.” Changing marriage in particular, and gender and sexuality in general—the process of locating, dislocating and relocating marriage, gender and
sexuality—possibly has the impact of lessening dominant group power
while showing potentially great positives for subordinated groups and society as a whole.
II. TROKOSI: CULTURAL/RELIGIOUS LOCATIONS OF FEMALE SEXUAL
SLAVERY
Aziza Botchway’s essay focuses primarily on Ghana as the location
for the practice of the Trokosi, which Botchway states “describe[s] both the
practice [of female sexual slavery] and the virgin female forced to serve the
54
priest involved in the practice.” Here the issue is that the Trokosi, though
violative of national and international law, is justified by culture and religion. The place and position of women is circumscribed by geographic
location, in this article the focus is on Ghana; the physical spaces, which are
the temples in which girls and women are enslaved; and the discursive
space of domestic and international law as it interacts with culture and religion in determining women’s lives.

51
52
53
54

Shahar, 836 F.Supp. at 859.
Poirier, supra note 2, at 329-30.
Id. at 335.
Botchway, supra note 5, at 371.
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The “fetish priest [ ] is the proxy for the gods” and the Trokosi can be
something with which to bargain for a family or village experiencing bad
luck or they can be used to serve out the sentence of a man convicted of a
56
crime. When a deal is struck, the girl or woman is dislocated from her
home and relocated to the temple. Her gender and gender role are dislocated as she is transformed from being a girl, woman, and daughter into
slave and wife, “married” off to the fetish priest in order to bring good luck
57
or as penance for a crime that may not have been committed at all. As
Botchway notes, the child may even be relocated far away from home such
58
that, if she were ever freed, she would be a stranger in a strange village.
59
Regardless of location she is still an outcast.
In the discursive space of Ghanaian law, women and girls are “not
60
overtly discriminated against.” The law also asserts protection for human
61
rights as well as special protection for children. Ghana is also a signatory
to, and has ratified several international human rights treaties, which the
62
In both the domestic and international spheres,
Trokosi contravenes.
Ghanaian girls and women should be protected against sexual enslavement
that is the Trokosi. But the argument asserted by those in support of the
continuation of the Trokosi is that it is a religious and cultural practice that
is and should continue to be protected as such.
Botchway asserts that the Trokosi is located within the religious and
cultural practices of Ghana as opposed to located within the boundaries of
63
international human rights anti-discrimination laws. Thus the fates of
women and girls are determined by cultural relativism, and they are
doomed to be sent off to be sexual slaves. Even though laws exist that can
and should protect women and girls, their intent and reality are dislocated
from each other. The intent of treaties and conventions may be to provide
64
women lives free from slavery, however the reality is that they may not be
65
“worth the paper [they are] printed on” if they cannot in reality prevent
women from being discriminated against and bartered into sexual slavery.
Like Poirier, Botchway asserts that the change must take place at the
local level. What must occur is that villages must begin to dislocate their
fates from the gender enslavement of women. Botchway suggests that
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Id. at 372 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 373.
Id.
Id. at 369.
Id.
Botchway, supra note 5, at 378.
Id. at 386-90.
Id.
Id. at 390-91.
Id. at 392.
Id.
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Ghana should “(1) begin with parental education, (2) provide support
66
groups for these women and (3) punish the priests.” These suggestions
each serve to dislocate the constructed roles for girls and women in places
that practice the Trokosi from the economic and legal troubles that individuals and communities face and to relocate girls and women under the rule
of law, domestic and international. In practical terms, women and girls may
need to be relocated into actual geographic locales where they are not
forced into sexual slavery or can successfully escape if coerced or forced
into the practice.
III. THE PRESIDENCY:
LOCATING GENDER IN THE WHITE HOUSE AND HOMELAND (SECURITY)
Professor Larry Catá Backer tackles the issue of gender in the context
67
of the rule of law and the U.S. Presidency. This work both responds to an
essay by Harvey Mansfield titled, The Law and the President: In a National
68
Emergency, Who You Gonna Call?, and expands on the issue of gender in
the Presidency. The location for the construction of gender is in the context
of domestic versus international arenas or the private versus the public
sphere. Backer makes the argument that “Mansfield suggests that Presidential power—gendered male—clearly suggests that the President’s Constitu69
tional powers extend beyond the mere execution of the laws.” Backer
writes, “[i]f law is male, . . . then rule of law is defectively male (and thus
70
subordinate as female)—passive, docile, and risk averse.” The physical
location for this discussion is in the “post 9-11” United States, however, the
gendering of the Presidency and the argument that presidential powers are
not bound by “rule of law” or “rule of law constitutionalism” is not limited
71
to the early twenty-first century.
Backer addresses the location of ideologies in noting that it is “well
understood in the West” that ideologies have “power . . . to discipline and
subordinate women” directly as well as through “defining, disciplining and
72
subordinating the ‘female’ in men.” These ideologies are located most
broadly in “the west,” more narrowly within the “American government”
73
and specifically, the Presidency. They are also located within a discursive
space bounded by law in general and, specifically, by the U.S. Constitu74
tion. According to Backer, in Mansfield’s essay it is “rule of law constitu-

66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74

Botchway, supra note 5, at 390.
Backer, supra note 6, at 341.
Mansfield, supra note 13.
Backer, supra note 6, at 341.
Id.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 341 (footnote omitted).
Id.
See id. at 341.
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tionalism” that works to essentially gender the “'true' constitutional framework envisioned by the Founders” as female, and thus it is rendered both
defective and ineffective especially when it comes to keeping America safe
75
in an international context. Mansfield uses this idea of the Presidency,
which is constructed as male, being feminized by rule of law constitutionalism to explain why there is a constitutionalism that actually demands that
76
the President “act beyond law under certain circumstances.” Thus, for
Mansfield there is a location that is beyond the law and that location is at
least masculine, if not fully male, space. It is a location that is in the public
sphere, concerned with protecting the nation from the international “evil
77
doers” hell bent on doing harm to the United States. Backer points out
that this is the traditional man’s role as savior and protector. The location
of the rule of law that is legitimately female is within the domestic sphere,
where women have always belonged.
In her essay, Botchway locates gender and gendering squarely within
one specific cultural context while Backer writes of a gendering which is
78
“trans-cultural.” Regardless whether one or many, the communities (locations), geographic and otherwise, are places and spaces that construct gender and control gendering. Gender is located within institutional systems of
power. The power of gender constructions and performances to subordinate
is partially determined by the location of the subordination—where it is
working. Backer notes that the subordination of women is located in both
the public and private spheres and is accomplished directly and indirectly
79
by subordinating women as women and women as not men.
It is the ascription of certain traits to certain genders in certain locations that makes for the gendering of, in this case, the Presidency, the President, and his actions. This gendering is accomplished by constructing certain traits and certain behaviors as feminine. They are constructed as feminine partially because of where they are performed, in this case the locating
of actions within the domestic sphere and under the rule of law. By adhering to the rule of law the action becomes female. It is extra-legal actions
that are male. As Backer writes, “It comes as no surprise, then, that male
elites in the United States, like those in other nations, continue to protect
the male gender borderlands of behavior norms. And there is no more po80
werful set of behavior norms than law in the United States.” Law is loca-
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79 Id. at 363.
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tion in and of itself. What the legal system does is to relocate those who are
behaving counter to the law back within its purview. Fundamentally, the
location issue is that there is a difference between the private and public
spheres. The private is domestic and the public international. The domestic
is feminine and the public masculine. That public space is male space and
is beyond law. Mansfield’s unitary executive is beyond even the rule of law
because he is located outside the law and it is only a “He” who is able to be
located beyond the law. A “She” is always located within legal bounds because she is a she.
Mansfield, and Backer in critiquing him, both invoke other locations
such as a “well ordered governmental house” which has a gendered aspect
to it in the sense that a house is a domestic space and that is women’s
81
space. The question is does the White House make the man? This house
has:
functional differentiation[s] inherent in separation of powers [which
are] both necessary and natural given the characteristics of each of the
elements of government—a domestic and rule bound legislature, and
judiciary—in contradistinction to the assertive and unbound protective
power of the executive. Constitutionalism merely institutionalizes and
82
assimilates these natural distinctions.
In this case the female/feminine, male/masculine distinctions are natural. The legislature and judiciary are domestic, rule bound and feminine,
83
and the executive is protective, public, extra-legal, and masculine.
But it is not only the branches of government that are spatially gender
limited, so too is the Constitution itself. Says Backer, “Rule-of-law constitutionalism is female space and, for Mansfield, insufficient. He tells the
84
reader: ‘[y]et the rule of law is not enough to run a government,’ and it
85
was government that the Constitution created.” According to Mansfield,
government needs to be located within the law and to be able to relocate
outside it. That which is within it is subordinate to that which is outside it.
There is a gendered hierarchy: public/international/extra-legal presidential
and dominant, and private/domestic/rule of law legislative/judicial and sub86
ordinate. The law itself is feminine and discretion is masculine. The separation of powers has a location and, again, it is the domestic and feminine
sphere versus the public and masculine sphere.
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For the executive not to have extra-legal or “extra-legislative” power
is to weaken him, thus creating an effeminate and hen-pecked executive.
The Presidency is male and must be understood as such. The President
must be understood as male because of the location of the extra-legal aspects of the law. It is in the public sphere, the job is that of protector of
both the public and the domestic sphere, not the controller of the private
sphere, and it is according to the Constitution that this is the way it is.
Mansfield asserts that the president cannot be located under the rule of law
because, according to Backer, “the rule-of-law cannot apply when law does
88
not apply.” There is a space within American constitutionalism, Mansfield
89
argues, “when liberties are dangerous and law does not apply.” “Lawlessness of this sort is both moral and lawful, precisely because it rejects the
90
weakness and stability [read femininity] of rule-of-law constitutionalism.”
It is the male’s responsibility to protect the home. It is the President’s responsibility to protect the homeland. Thus, the Presidency itself is masculine space. In closing, Backer sums up Mansfield’s argument and explains
why the Presidency is thus gendered male. “If law is male, Mansfield suggests, then rule-of-law is defectively male (and thus subordinate as fe91
male)—passive, docile, and risk-averse.” The result, Backer argues, is
92
that the Presidency becomes “corroded” and transformed into a form of
dictatorship.
[B]y imposing and enforcing these differences, differences based on a
need to distinguish male from female behavior—more from less valued—
Mansfield’s exercise in “manliness” is symptomatic of the more subtle and
corroding subversive nature of the hierarchy of male gendering. Intrasexual gender role hierarchies, based on a normative model of male role
supremacy, continue to marginalize the normatively female, both within
each sex and between the sexes. When this marginalization becomes the
93
stuff of constitutional analysis, “caudillismo cannot be too far behind.”
Backer does end by noting, “The gendered legal order still survives in94
tact.” However, it is the “traditional binary,” not Mansfield’s inverted one,
“which genders rule of law as male, and the domestic portion of the private
95
sphere, female and thus extra-legal” that survives. Under the traditional
gender binary, the unregulated space that is extra legal is female space, not
male space. It is extra-legal not because of a superiority, but because it is
87
88
89
90
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92
93
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not worthy of the attention of the State. The masculine space of the unitary
executive warrants attention and should be located where it will receive
much scrutiny.
IV. ON TELEVISION: (RE)(DIS)LOCATING LATINOS IN (CSI) MIAMI
Diane Klein begins her essay by locating it firmly within the LatCrit
96
arena by invoking LatCrit V, and situating this work within the cultural
97
studies arena addressed by “many LatCrit scholars.” It is, according to
Klein, the LatCrit way to be democratic even in the cultural realm because
like culture studies, LatCrit “rejects the distinction between so-called low
culture and high culture and argues that all forms of culture need to be stu98
died in relation to a given social formation.” In this case, Klein is examining CSI: Miami as a cultural phenomenon that presents and represents Latinos. Her work is a response to the call put out by Professor Perry to “interrogate the cultural narratives that reinforce and perpetuate racial biased
99
workplace situations.” Klein examines two workplaces, the workplace of
the show itself and what it represents, as well as the police station and forensic laboratory, workplaces within the show. Similar to the other articles
in this cluster, Klein addresses the cultural narratives that shape gender and
sexuality. Here, the cultural narrative tells of Latinos/as on television as
both actors and characters, and the stereotyping and sometimes counterstereotyping that occurs.
Klein’s essay explores multiple locations: the workplace of the television production, Miami—the locale of the show itself—and the presentation
of the fictionalized workplace, as well as fictionalized Miami. There are
also personal locations/locales. Gender and sexuality themselves are locations with the actual meaning of where a person “is” at the time, as in where
they would be placed or place themselves on sexuality or gender continua,
100
such as the Kinsey scale. There is also the issue of the influence of geographic locale on gender and sexuality as well as the influence of other
identities. Klein’s focus is on “institutional, rather than psychological
101
sources of racism and discrimination.”
Klein examines five seasons of CSI: Miami, constructing an elaborate
coding system to address the issue of stereotyping. She notes different ma96
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jor themes specifically, finding a running theme of masculinity and criminality expressed primarily through the Latino characters including Eric
Delko, the one Latino CSI. Though the white male CSIs also break the
rules, it seems that rarely do they break the law, whereas Delko does. Latinos are also portrayed as the “Latin lovers.” This, too, includes Eric Delko.
Locales are conflated when it comes to the Latinos in CSI: Miami.
Klein points out that rarely are the locales from whence the Latinos come
differentiated from the others. Though occasionally one does note a real or
fictionalized Latin American country a character may come from, generally
there is a sense of Pan-Latinoness about the characters and the storylines. It
is as if differentiating between and among the individuals would take too
much research and, thus, all Latinos are lumped together as one identity.
Though often lumped together geographically as well as stereotypical102
ly, there is the case of what Klein explains and Lolita Inniss identifies as
103
the “exemplary other.” Klein identifies that the exemplary other is based
on stereotyping, explaining that: “The construction of certain members of a
group as ‘exemplary others’ is a subordinating technique. It co-opts those it
identifies as ‘exemplary,’ and does so by enforcing their differences from
104
other members of the subordinated group.” Stereotyping can locate identities in the camp of “other” or “exemplary other” both of which are removed from the one who is the standard by which the “others” are judged.
The question for CSI: Miami is whether Eric Delko is simply “other” or
“exemplary other.” Given that the context is Miami, which has a very high
Cuban population, having a Cuban, non-Anglo man working in law enforcement as a CSI might not be uncommon. However Delko may be an
exemplary other, an extra special Cuban Man, not like the “simply” others.
It is also possible that the Eric Delko is an example of racialized gender or gendered racial counter stereotyping when taken as a threedimensional character. He is generally located “outside the dominant ste105
reotypes of criminality and hypersexuality” and, for the most part, passes
106
the “‘stereotype commutation’ test,” in that the character of Eric Delko
did not have to be Latino, though it may have been odd to have an office
located in Miami and not have a Cuban character.
Klein also addresses class and location by specifically analyzing “La107
tinos in Upper Class Racially-Mixed Neighborhoods.”
All identities—
race, class, ethnicity, gender and sexuality—have locational aspects. Klein
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concludes that CSI: Miami has managed to de-Latinize or to Anglicize a
very Latino/a location/geography—the city of Miami—dislocating a distinctly Latino, particularly Cuban, identity. Also CSI: Miami both dislocates and relocates Latino sexuality within and without the workplace and
within and without Miami, both the real and the fictionalized place.
CONCLUSION
These four essays call attention to the notion that physical space, as in
actual locations, can be both normative and normalizing. Where one performs one’s gender/sexuality can indicate that a certain level of normality is
attached to that identity. Certain aspects of Cuban masculinity may be
identified as normal in Miami but may be considered less normal elsewhere. It is generally considered normal to have sex in private and abnormal or deviant to have sex in public. Marrying within a church can normalize same-sex relationships in a way that legal sanctioning does not. The
idea is that there are proper or socially-sanctioned places to perform identity and improper ones. The proper/improper dichotomy is as socially constructed as gender and sexuality itself, and, as the essays point out, can
serve to harm subordinated identities. Some identities are considered to
have no proper social location, as with LGBT identities, and with others,
the Trokosi for example, the proper location is a deadly one.
As the essays indicate, subordinated people and identities continue to
search for and create places to perform their sexuality and gender and to
live their lives. LGBT persons will be a part of marriage and the marriage
debate. Women are a part of international human rights law and will continue to work to implement laws within Ghana and other areas practicing
Trokosi until they are relocated physically and discursively to a place of
safety. The feminine, even if stereotypically defined as domestic, cannot be
excluded from the Presidency because it is through and against the female
and thus femininity that males and masculinity are constructed and defined.
There is no masculine without the feminine and thus the Presidential space
already and always includes the female. Finally, regardless of whether Latino masculinity is stereotyped or counter-stereotyped, locating CSI: Miami
in Miami is to be in Latino space. It is one place where Latinos simply are
and, to paraphrase Patricia Williams, the presence of Latinos within, as opposed to without, the bell jar of a “real” or “fictionalized” (CSI) Miami
108
changes the dynamic forever.
As Diane Klein notes, studying all levels of culture is an aspect of
109
110
LatCrit scholarship.
Location or “whereness,” which includes both
108
109
110
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physical and discursive space, is part of cultural analysis. Each of these
essays shows the importance of gender and sexual whereness in the construction of law and culture. Klein’s essay raises the specific question of
locale—the geography itself, the actual there that is there—fictionally constructed or not and its effect on gender and sexuality. I was inspired by
Klein’s article to ask the question: Is gender and/or sexuality different in
different locales? All four essays lead me to answer “yes”. What I mean is
that the actual place itself does have an effect on gender and sexuality and
vice versa. I assert that there is an argument to be made that weather, temperature, topography, architecture, etcetera—the specifics of locale—do
construct and/or affect the performance of gender or sexuality, and the performance of gender and sexuality effect the actual places themselves.
These essays only touch on this in a limited manner thus leaving work for
other LatCrit scholars to further address gender, sexuality, and critical localities and to posit more answers to the question, “Where is there?”

